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SOURCE FRIB (This strictly factual report is based solely on monitored foreign radio broadcasts recoived in Washington up to 7 a.m., 17 June 1949. It reproduces a report prepared in response to a special request.)

INTRODUCTION: Since the root recent report (No. 6) of this series, probably one of the most interesting elements of Seviet, Satellite, and Soviet-controlled German brostcasts about the CFM Conference has been their fairly systematic development of argumentative bases for: (1) charging the Western Powers with nesponsibility for Conference failure on the "fundamental" issues; (2) derogating Western motives for a limited agreement on the resumption of East-West trade; and (3) crediting the Soviet Drion with the only consistently just attempt to achieve Conference success. All of these lines of approach have been included in previous broadcasts, but not quite as overtly as in several recent broadcasts. The Soviet peace treat, proposals. which are given a fair ascent of attention, are used as much for "exposing" the West's "splitting" intentions and uncooperative attitude as for demonstrating the "correctness" of the Soviet arguments at the Conference. Such issues as the Occupation Statute, the Bonn Constitution. the Berlin problem, the currency question, the unaminity principle, and the German "National Front" received familiar treatment. Soviet-controlled German broadcasts, continuing to identify the Berlin rail strike with the "obstructive" Western attitude in Paris, accuse Howley of "organizing a usnesser of ecospica" in order to prolong the strike for the purpose of "again disturbing the Paris Conference and evoking the danger of war." The first monitored Yugoslav comments about the Conference echo Soviet propaganda on the one hand; as ion the other, complain about the refusel of "all foreign ministers except Mr. Schuman" to discuss the Austrian treaty with the Tugoslav Ambessador.

"PROPAGAIDA" AND THE CONFERENCE: On 15 and 16 June, a widely broadcast PRAVDA article by Your Zhukov suggests the intended switches of Vishinsky's peace treaty proposals. Contending

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that Asheson was evidently sware wast the impression would be on world public caision of a direct reflect to accept the clear-out Soviet proposals aiming ... at a speedy peace treaty. Zhukov attaibutes to this awareness Acheson's "unconcealed irritation," his "ver queer manner," his "comfused and muddled" arguments, and his attempt to "switch attention to other matter : Faced with a "quandary," Acheson, supported by Bevin and Schuman, "did not reject the properties cutright, but suggested that they be referred for analysis to the deputy ministers"-a "maneuver" designed to "shelve the Soviet proposals." And thereby the Western delegations "caused the collapse of the... propagands structure which they had been building up for three weeks" and which was aimed at "creating the impression that they are championing the interests of the Germans. ... The USSR delegation proved convincingly that such assertices are insincere.... (And) by rejecting the Soviet proposals,... the Western Powers have involuntarily confirmed the correctness of the (Soviet) arguments." Other commentaries also devote explicit attention to the subject of propagation. Linetsky, for example, making much of the "mystematic" Western rejection of all of the "concrete" Soviet proposals, accuses the BBC of attempting reverse the roles and explains the attempt as "an effort to mislead world public opinion so that the blame can be shifted over to the Soviet Union well in advance." Varying the thems, a Soviet-controlled German broadcast charges that "by dour rejection of all Soviet proposals, the three Western ministers obviously thought that... they could induce the Soviet Foreign Minister to break off the Conference" and therefore blame the USSR for "having targedoed the Conference and having prevented Germany's unity." But the USSR relentlessly pursued the only path leading to peace and submitted concrete suggestions, "foremost among them" being the beace treaty proposals; as a result, "the Western Powers more forced to admit that their... strengts at having the Conference torpedoed by the Soviet Union had failed pitifully."

WHAT DOES THE VEST WANT? WHY DID THEY WANT TO CONVENE THIS CONFERENCE? Having 'groved' that the Western Powers are striving to maintain indefinitely the occupation regime and a dismembered Germany, the above-mentioned Zhukov article proceeds to apply to them a question that American observers have repeatedly raised about the USSR. "Diplomatic observers." says Zhukov, "have repeatedly asked themselves the question: What do the delegations of the Western Powers really want? Why did they bring up the question of calling the correct session of the CFM?"* The answer is that they came to Paris "to set aside the fundamental problems... and to come to terms... only (on) resumption of trade with Eastern Germany." But even the motives for this alleged goal are declared suspect: resumption of trade is of vital concern to the "German-American trusts in the Western Zone"; Americans want to relieve the scorom's stagnation of West Germany and need an Eastern outlet for West-German goods that would otherwise compete with American products; "it seems that the Americans have finally understood that the East has always been a natural and traditional market for German goods" and the American economic "crisis" is compelling them "to grasp at any and every opportunity to reduce excessive expenditures." And returning in his final paragraph to the Soviet proposals, Zickov declares that on their basis "agreement could be reached on all questions, including the course 2 question." Thus, he lays the argument for accusing the West of obstructing solution of the "fundamental problems" and for attributing an invidious role to the Western Powers and a positive role to the USSR** in the event of a limited economic agreement. Satellite and Soviets controlled German broadcasts echo the same line.

Western attempt to extend their regime to "East Germany, which is developing in a democratic spirit under (Soviet) protection." TANYUG also complains that Austria's Gruber tad long talks with all the Big Four ministers, whereas only Schuman talked with the Yugoslav Isbassador about the Austrian treaty; if Gruber's talks established a basis for agreement, this will be "ar incomprehensible act directed against Yugoslav interests." Soviet commentaries have not mentioned the subject of an Austrian peace treaty.



^{*} Earlier Soviet and Satellite broadcasts gave the USSR the credit for the Confinence meeting; now, when it suits the propagandist's purpose, the West "brought up the question."

^{***} In other contexts, also, Soviet commentaries continue their outspoken espouse of East-West trade.